And it is a context in which the school boards plans simply set race-conscious limits at the outer boundaries of a broad range. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. Neither of the programs before us today is compelled as a remedial measure, and no one makes such a claim. 2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999) (Hampton I). . See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 211 (1976) (concurring opinion). Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494, that interest is not involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved. Past allegations in another case provide no basis for resolving these cases. Nor is it likely to find such a case. Justice Breyer makes much of the fact that in 1978 Seattle settled an NAACP complaint alleging illegal segregation with the federal Office for Civil Rights (OCR). This interest, the Court said, can be achieved by considering the student overall, not just his or her race, and the contribution he or she can make to the schools diversity. Opinions differed. With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the Court. 1 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty., Bd. Although the District tried to make each high school unique by offering different programs, thus making each desirable, some schools were significantly more popular than others. of Cal. See Powell 35. The Court split 414 on key aspects of the case, with Justice Kennedy writing the swing vote opinion and agreeing with four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) that the programs used by Seattle and Louisville did not pass constitutional muster (because the districts failed to demonstrate that their plans were sufficiently narrowly tailored), but Kennedy also found, along with four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg), that compelling interests exist in avoiding racial isolation and promoting diversity. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. (rejecting argument that strict scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that disadvantage minorities, stating [r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination). Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. As Justice Marshall said, unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion). See Croson, 488 U. S., at 501 (The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis); West Virginia Bd. App. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 11691170 (CA9 2005) (en banc). 2841. This is incorrect. A 1987 Civil Rights Commission Study of 125 school districts in the Nation demonstrated the breadth and variety of desegregation plans: The [study] documents almost 300 desegregation plans that were implemented between 1961 and 1985. Again, neither school board asserts that its race-based actions were taken to remedy prior discrimination. As I have pointed out, supra, at 4, de facto resegregation is on the rise. How could the plurality adopt a constitutional standard that would hold unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans adopted by numerous school boards over the past 50 years while remaining true to this Courts desegregation precedent? Was it de facto? 1995). Rather, such powers should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution. 515 U. S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Id. 05908, pp. This the Constitution forbids. Ibid. Four basic considerations have led me to this view. area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respond- In part for those reasons, the Court has never permitted outright racial balancing solely for the purpose of achieving a particular racial balance. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. Far from being narrowly tailored to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the school district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. Brief for Respondent at 2434. For example, at Franklin High School in Seattle, the racial tiebreaker was applied because nonwhite enrollment exceeded 69 percent, and resulted in an incoming ninth-grade class in 20002001 that was 30.3 percent Asian-American, 21.9 percent African-American, 6.8 percent Latino, 0.5 percent Native-American, and 40.5 percent Caucasian. (a)Because racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting), governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based on individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505506. A 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools vs. Seattle School District #1, limited the. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test from strict to fatal in factthe very opposite of what Grutter said. In both cases the efforts were in part remedial. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School - CaseBriefs However, the question as to whether the constitution requires a local school board, or a State, to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not here concerned. Brief for Petitioner at 38. When a court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the State. 05908, p.13, n.13. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. [Footnote 21] The dissent argues that weight [must be given] to a local school boards knowledge, expertise, and concerns, post, at 48, and with equal vigor, the segregationists argued for deference to local authorities. The issue here is whether the constitution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State action aimed toward reducing and eventually eliminating de facto school segregation. Parents Involved, the Court noted that: Seattle and Louisville had not demonstrated that they seriously considered race-neutral alternatives; the individual racial classifications used had a minimal impact that cast doubt on their necessity; the districts defined See ibid. That is particularly true given that, when Swann was decided, this Court had not yet confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications like those before us. The dissents reliance on this interest is, therefore, inconsistent with Wygant. See, e.g., Part IB, supra. Rather, race-based government decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as unconstitutional attempts to implement race-based assignment planssuch as the plans at issue herein primary and secondary schools. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schoolsCleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). [Footnote 8]. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish these goals. In sum, the districts race-conscious plans satisfy strict scrutiny and are therefore lawful. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlans axiom must command our assent. This assertion is inexplicable. 10925, 26 Fed. One amicus reports that [i]n study after study, racial composition of a student body, when isolated, proves to be an insignificant determinant of student achievement. Brief for Dr. John Murphy etal. [S]chool districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate desegregation (emphasis added)); School Comm. See ante, at 1112, 3132, n.16, 3435 (citing Adarand, supra, at 227; Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003)). For one thing, consider the effect of the pluralitys views on the parties before us and on similar school districts throughout the Nation. 05908. See Hallinan & Williams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary Schools, 54 Am. in No. Racial imbalance is not segregation. Even if these measures were appropriate as remedies in the face of widespread resistance to Browns mandate, they are not forever insulated from constitutional scrutiny. Gratz involved a system where race was not the entire classification. 1, pp. 7231. The subsequent statements by the unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact. . at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and Assignments 20052006 School Year (Apr. These include the facially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component. k12. That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow. They do not impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek benefits for members of all races alike. In an effort to achieve its desired racial balance in its popular high schools, the Seattle school Are they to spend days, weeks, or months seeking independently to validate the use of ratios that this Court has repeatedly authorized in prior cases? No. However, Roberts considers that this interest is not compelling and that the use of race for this goal is not narrowly tailored, it is instead used for racial balancing, which is unconstitutional. would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to reflect that mixture. [I]ntegration, we are told, has three essential elements. Ibid. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. Observers claim that the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 2002). The Court explained that [c]ontext matters in applying strict scrutiny, and repeatedly noted that it was addressing the use of race in the context of higher education. Grutter, supra, at 327, 328, 334. The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High Schools special Biotechnology Career Academy. The transfer might have had an adverse effect on the effort to approach district-wide racial proportionality at Young, but it had nothing to do with preventing either the black or other group from becoming small or isolated at Young. Given that state law had previously required the school board to maintain a dual school system, the county was obligated to take measures to remedy its prior de jure segregation. Another amicus surveys several social science studies and concludes that a fair and comprehensive analysis of the research shows that there is no clear and consistent evidence of [educational] benefits. Brief for David J. Armor etal. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. In concurrence with the majority opinion Justice Clarence Thomas restated his view, in agreement with Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, that the Constitution is "color-blind." Because this Court has authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 of Springfield v. Board of Ed., 362 Mass. Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but beneficent and progressive? At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.
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